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Abstract. User privacy has become a hot topic within the identity manage-
ment arena. However, the field still lacks comprehensive frameworks even 
though most identity management solutions include built-in privacy fea-
tures. This study explores how best to set up a single control point for users 
to manage privacy policies for their personal information, which may be 
distributed (scattered) across a set of network-centric identity management 
systems. Our goal is a user-centric approach to privacy management. As the 
number of schemas and frameworks is very high, we chose to validate our 
findings with a prototype based on the Liberty Alliance architecture and 
protocols.  
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1   Introduction  
Being online today means so much more than just being connected to the Internet 
and browsing simple Web sites. Users join, interact with and enjoy social Web 
sites and online communities such as Facebook and MySpace, photo and video 
hosting Web sites such as Flickr and YouTube, streaming music programs such as 
Spotify and Last.fm, application stores such as the Apple App Store, online banks 
and e-commerce businesses such as PayPal, e-government sites, and so forth.  
The process is quite simple. Users create a new account on any of these feature-
rich content and service providers by filling in a registration form and providing a 
few personal details. Additionally, by accepting the default service privacy policy, 
users may allow the provider to share these details with the outside world. At the 
end of the process, the user is allowed to access and enjoy the provider's site. 
The amount of scattered personal information begins to grow as users repeat 
this simple process with different providers. As a result, some undesirable prob-
lems can arise: not only the most obvious of bad user experience (users have to 
remember different logins and passwords), and increased risk of identity theft, but, 
eventually, data privacy concerns. In this context, we understand privacy as some-
one’s right to keep their personal information and relationships secret and thereby 
reveal themselves selectively. 
In truth, the privacy concerns might not be a problem. Legislation usually 
forces providers (to different extents, depending on the jurisdiction) to handle user 
data in accordance with the law. Thus, service providers generally offer different 
mechanisms and custom tools to manage user data. However, the resulting hetero-
geneity is a huge disadvantage for users who wish to actively manage and control 
their personal information. As concluded by a thorough analysis of 45 social net-
working sites [1], "privacy in social networks is dysfunctional in that there is sig-
nificant variation in sites' privacy controls, data collection requirements, and le-
gal privacy policies".  
In summary, users currently lack a simple mechanism to verify what personal 
information is available on the Web, how it is used and how they can modify, up-
date or delete it. Our vision is that in the short run privacy awareness will rise 
much higher as a result of the lack of comprehensive solutions. Thus governments 
and individuals alike will demand simple tools to govern the use and release of 
their personal information. In this article, we introduce a solution that aims to ad-
dress some of these problems by enabling users to manage their personal data pri-
vacy in a simple and efficient way. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. First, in section 2 and 3 we 
describe the main approaches to identity management and stress the differences 
between them regarding privacy control. Then, section 4 details the solution that 
we have implemented to enable users to manage their personal data privacy in a 
simple and efficient way. After that, section 5 describes the validation we have 
conducted. Finally, section 6 analyses the state of the art of the related work and 
section 7 concludes the paper. 
2   Network-Centric Identity Management 
Identity Management commonly refers to the processes involved in the manage-
ment and selective disclosure of user-related identity information, either within an 
institution or between several entities, while preserving and enforcing both priva-
cy and security requirements. Identity management systems can be classified ac-
cording to several different criteria. A common taxonomy distinguishes network- 
from user-centric approaches. With regard to the former, the first comprehensive 
specifications were created by the Liberty Alliance Project [2], a business alliance 
established in 2001, which has been recently succeeded by the Kantara Initiative 
[3]. Its early work was followed by others such as SAML 2.0 (Security Assertion 
Markup Language) [4] and WS-Federation [5]. 
The Liberty approach to identity federation and identity-based web services as-
sociates service providers with trusted domains (identity networks), which are 
supported by Liberty technology and operative agreements through which trust re-
lationships are defined between providers. The identity network infrastructure 
supports users in transacting business with associated providers in a secure and 
apparently seamless environment. Each company maintains its own customer ac-
counts, including relevant identity resources. Users can federate (link) accounts at 
different providers using an opaque pseudonym, which enables a single sign-on 
between providers and allows for the secure sharing of identity information.  
Some entities may focus on managing these federations, as well as providing 
ancillary services: 
• Identity Providers (IdP) know all users and service providers within the iden-
tity network and their affiliations. They also know how to authenticate users; 
thus, they can certify a user's identity to any provider. Whenever users want to 
access a service provider, they will be redirected to the IdP, where they will 
be authenticated. Once a user has successfully logged in, the IdP will send a 
statement back to the service provider containing information related to the 
identity of the user (pseudonym), information about other entities within the 
identity network and the credentials needed to access them. 
• Discovery Services (DS) record where the users' identity resources are stored 
within the identity network. When a service provider wishes to find any user’s 
information it sends a query to the DS, which returns the endpoint reference 
for that resource and a valid credential for one-time access. 
In the Liberty context, a service provider is a Web service that acts with a cer-
tain identity resource to retrieve information about an identity, update information 
about an identity or perform an action for the benefit of some identity. A service 
provider may play the roles of both an identity-based Web Service Consumer 
(WSC) or an identity-based Web Service Provider (WSP). WSPs usually aggre-
gate several identity resources into an identity profile (e.g., a personal profile or 
address book). The Liberty protocol that allows WSCs to access WSPs to 
query/update/delete personal data on behalf of a user is called the Data Service 
Template (DST) [6]. 
Within a given Liberty-based identity network, privacy is supposed to be han-
dled by the user at each WSP (and not at the IdP/DS level). From that point on, the 
WSP is responsible for managing user privacy settings and preferences. The me-
thod for choosing and recording privacy settings is outside the scope of the Liber-
ty specifications. 
3   User-Centric Identity Management  
Network-centric identity management approaches, such as the one proposed by 
the Liberty Alliance, have failed to reach the interest (and trust) of users, becom-
ing constrained to the enterprise or governmental domains. For years, companies 
(especially telecommunication operators) have controlled user attributes: they 
know who you are, what is done with some of your identity-related information, 
who is using it, how and for what. Fortunately now, multiple service providers po-
pulate the Internet without being associated to any operator thus bringing the ex-
isting identity management systems towards a new scope around the concept of 
user centricity. 
The term user-centric was introduced in the identity management arena in about 
2006. A user-centric identity management system “needs to support user control 
and considers user-centric architectural and usability aspects” [7]. Two main 
principles support user-centric identity management: 
• The user is in the middle of a data transaction. Any information that flies be-
tween any entity pass through the user as a must condition, who has the power 
of consenting the transaction.  
• Huge scale advantages, since the identity provider does not need to know 
about every service provider, the user directly deals with them. The identity 
provider can simply be used to validate the information that will be sent to the 
service provider.  
User-centric identity management principles can be implemented by different 
means but the most popular ones can be divided into two categories, namely: 
URL- and card-based systems. 
• Simple URL-based systems are decentralized and use URLs as users’ identifi-
ers. Compatible service providers accept identifiers created by a trusted entity 
(the identity provider); users are free to choose any identity provider to create 
an identity. The security of the transaction depends on how much the user re-
lies on her identity provider. 
This is precisely one of the drawbacks of this approach. Malicious identity 
providers may give a false trust feeling, allowing unaware users to gain access 
to malicious service providers. Once inside the service provider, the victims 
can be easily cheated taking advantage of a false security feeling. Some ex-
amples of URL-based systems are OpenID [8] and LID (Light-Weight Identi-
ty) [9].  
• Identity card-based systems are built using the information card metaphor 
[10]. Although there are different definitions of this concept, the simplest 
could be that expressed by the Information Card Foundation [11]: “Informa-
tion Cards are the digital version of the cards you carry in your purse or wal-
let today. You use them with a new kind of digital wallet called a selector.” 
Selectors are pieces of software that complement Web browsers and allow us-
ers to choose the information card that will be supplied to service providers 
upon access. Depending on the user identity information that the service pro-
vider requires, the user chooses a certain information card. In these systems 
users decide, using a single interface (the card selector), which pieces of their 
identity they share with a given service provider. This approach gives users 
excellent control over their identity resources: they can assume at least partial 
control over their privacy, while enjoying enhanced usability.  
Additionally, card-based systems provide user with a consistent user expe-
rience. No matter what service provider is being used or what type of identity 
information is being enclosed towards them. In general, users interact with the 
same type of identity managers for every identity transaction they do. This is 
an important difference with respect to the network centric identity manage-
ment scenario, where each service provider provides its own user interface 
which means the user is learning a new interface, sometime simply for using 
it only one time (for instance, at registration time). Examples of identity card 
based systems are Higgins [12] and Windows Cardspace [13]. 
However, several security and privacy issues arise in information card based 
systems [14]. Firstly, the identity providers are aware of the service providers 
to which the user attempts to log in, so malicious identity provider can learn 
about the behavior of the users on the Web. Secondly, and even more impor-
tant, is the problem of the reliance on the user’s judgment of the trustworthi-
ness of the service provider. This means that if a service provider is not trust-
worthy, it could gather information about users and potentially use this in 
unauthorized ways. 
In both URL- and card-based approaches, the user identity information sharing 
happens in the foreground, since the user must be online and the service provider 
must actively request this information. This might be seen as a major handicap 
since users must be online and connected with the consumer service provider. Ad-
ditionally, users cannot configure default privacy preferences to infer automated 
decisions regarding the release of their identity information. Instead, users must 
always give explicit permission for the release of information on a per-request ba-
sis.  
Furthermore, it is unrealistic to expect that all user-related data are reachable 
through a user agent. Consider, for instance, information such as cellular network-
based location information. Moreover, consider identity-based services such as 
sending an SMS or billing the user on behalf of a third party. These are identity-
based services that only a specialized identity-based service provider can offer, 
preferably within a trusted domain.  
4   Self-service Privacy in Practice 
We feel that network-centric identity management solutions are essential to man-
age some identity information and identity-based transactions. However, a user-
centric approach to privacy enabling consistent user-experience is still required in 
order to provide users with adequate control of their information. Therefore we in-
troduce a solution that merges both approaches, providing a user-centric privacy 
approach to a network-centric identity management solution to put the concept of 
Self-Service Privacy into practice. 
Fig. 1 introduces a high-level view of a network-centric identity management 
architecture consistent with the Liberty Alliance specifications. A new entity has 
been added to this architecture, namely Privacy Controller (PC). The PC joins the 
identity network so that its users can federate (link) their accounts with those they 
have in other providers (using pseudonyms).  
Using this new entity users are able to: 
1. Retrieve a global view (snapshot) of their identity resources across different 
nodes of the identity network to understand which identity resources are stored, 
where they exist and their specific values. Users are also allowed to modify and 
delete any data. 
2. See the history of how their identity resources have been used, i.e., what enti-
ties have requested them, when, the outcome of each request, etc. 
3. Govern the future use and release of all identity resources by setting privacy 
preferences. 
A generic requirement for all scenarios is that the PC must be authenticated, on 
behalf of the user, against the identity network in order to gain access to partici-
pating entities. The authentication is carried out against the IdP following standard 
Liberty protocols (Fig. 1, flow 0) using the pseudonyms obtained during the feder-
ation process. At the end of the authentication process the PC obtains an endpoint 
reference and credentials to access the DS.  
Apart from these interactions, Fig. 1 also shows some other information flows. 
There is a communication flow between the user and the PC through a Graphical 
User Interface (GUI). The PC shows information to users and, in response, users 
take certain actions and decisions, which are sent back to the PC in order to drive 
the aforementioned flows. 
Flows labelled A, B and C correspond to standard protocols as defined by the 
Liberty specifications: (A) a WSP informs the DS that it is storing an identity re-
source for a certain user; (B) a WSC queries the DS to discover which WSP stores 
selected identity resources about a user and also asks the DS for credentials to 
access them; and (C) a WSC uses the credentials retrieved in (B) to attempt to 
access an identity resource stored in a WSP. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Overview of the Privacy Controller.  
The following sections further elaborate on each particular scenario in order to 
describe the functionality that allows user-centric privacy management of distri-
buted personal information. 
4.1   Providing a Snapshot of Distributed User Identity Resources 
Our first sample scenario is a combination of two major flows. Firstly, users see 
an overall picture of the distribution of their identity resources (Fig. 2, steps 0 to 
4). Through this flow, the user is able to determine which parties are hosting user 
resources and what kind of resources are being stored. Once the users have seen 
the overall set of identity resources, they can choose to manage (modify or delete) 
any or all of the stored data (Fig. 2, steps 5 to 11). 
 
 
Fig. 2. Sequence diagram for the retrieval and management of identity resources. 
The PC performs as a Liberty WSC to query or update a WSP using the DST 
protocol. The PC receives the end-point reference and the credentials needed to 
access the WSP each time information about identity resources is retrieved (Fig. 2, 
step 3).  
Fig. 3 shows a screenshot of the user interface that we have implemented for 
the PC. It is an example of the personal data that a user has stored in two different 
WSPs (iProfile and myPaymentBroker). Specifically, it indicates that myPay-
mentBroker stores two personal resources (name and credit card) that the user can 
edit and modify. 
  
Fig. 3. Screenshot of the PC providing a snapshot of distributed personal data. 
4.2   Retrieving the Usage History for Identity Resources 
In this scenario a user wants to know the usage history of one of their previously 
obtained identity resources. The PC shows the usage history for that resource with 
details about the resource type and value, timestamps of access and all WSCs that 
accessed the resource. Further information can be presented if available, such as 
privacy protection commitments made by the requestor, or conditions on the re-
lease of the information.  
Fig. 4 shows a screenshot of the user interface that we have implemented. It 
shows the services that have requested access to an identity resource (credit card 
details stored at myPaymentBroker), for what purpose, the timestamp of the re-
quest and the outcome of the process (shown with self-explaining icons). 
 
 
Fig. 4. Screenshot of the PC showing a usage history for a personal data 
There are several approaches to gathering usage history. An approach based on 
proactive notifications from the WSP that stores the identity resource to the PC is 
not viable because it might cause scalability and performance problems in the 
event of large bursts of notifications. These problems can be reduced using thre-
sholds and timers to smooth out the data flow. Nevertheless, this mechanism is 
always WSP-initiated (push mode), preventing the PC from requesting informa-
tion at will. 
A better approach is to extend the Liberty identity profiles with information 
that registers the use of the identity resources. These records can be considered an 
extension of the information in a profile since they add relevant information about 
the retrieval of identity resources. As in the previous scenario, the PC uses the 
DST protocol to retrieve this information. The main benefit of this approach is that 
it can be PC-initiated (pull mode). This means that the information is retrieved 
whenever the PC requires it and is limited to PC requests. Thus, we do not foresee 
any scalability or performance issues. Additionally, the Liberty specifications for 
identity services consider extensions of the identity resources, and thus our solu-
tion can be considered Liberty-compliant. 
We assume at this point that every WSP registers the request and release of the 
identity resources it stores. This information could be used, for example, for future 
audits (in fact, this may be compulsory under the laws in certain countries). The 
minimum information to be recorded at the WSP every time a WSC tries to access 
an identity resource includes: 
• UserID – to identify whose information is being accessed. This is the user 
alias in the WSP. 
• IdentityResourceType – to identify what information has been accessed. This 
is a subset of the information included within the identity profile. 
• WSC – to identify who requested the information. 
• Other information – for example, the time of access. Other relevant informa-
tion that could be useful for future requirements may be the intended use of 
the information retrieved, whether the WSC will share it with third parties, 
and the promises the WSC makes about any future use of the requested in-
formation. 
4.3   Enabling User-Centric Privacy Management 
This scenario elaborates on the mechanisms that allow users to centrally manage 
their privacy preferences. The scenario is composed of four major steps: 
1. The user selects a specific identity resource stored in a WSP and reviews its 
privacy preferences.  
2. The PC retrieves and displays the privacy preferences associated with that iden-
tity resource. 
3. The user modifies the privacy preferences and the PC updates them in the 
WSP. 
4. The WSP enforces the privacy preferences whenever a requestor tries to access 
the identity resource. 
Initial preferences might have been set by the user at the service provider’s site 
or by the service provider itself using default values, or they can even be unde-
fined. Privacy preferences follow a default-deny pattern: An empty set of prefe-
rences implies that all requests should be denied (other than those issued by the 
PC itself). Each preference added to the set grants a specific type of permission.  
The PC allows users to change the policy applied to an identity resource by se-
lecting one of a set of pre-defined policies, each of which is described in natural 
language. This natural language description is mapped to a specific policy de-
scribed in machine-oriented privacy policy expression language. Policies are hie-
rarchical so that it is easier for users to compare them and choose the one that best 
meets their needs. This approach benefits from simplicity and usability because 
users do not have to deal with technical policy details. 
Additionally, the PC allows users to define specific options for the use and re-
lease of each data element from their profile (Fig. 5). Although this approach pro-
vides greater flexibility, it also poses some usability risks, since only advanced us-
ers understand (and probably want to know) the detailed meaning of each 
available policy. Therefore, this is offered only as an advanced option. 
 
 
 
Fig. 5. Screenshot of the PC to control privacy preferences  
The variables that define a custom privacy preference include the identity re-
source, the requestor of the identity resource, the operation requested, the permis-
sion level chosen by the user and the resource owner identifier. The identity re-
source values are constrained to those defined within the identity profile provided 
by the WSP. The requestor can be any WSC from within the identity network. The 
operation values might be those defined in a DST protocol (i.e., query, create, de-
lete, modify and subscribe). The permission can be set to grant, deny or askMe, 
when the user prefers to decide on a per–request basis. 
Since the number of rule combinations will increase exponentially (number of 
requestors multiplied by number of identity resources), we allow for simpler op-
tions such as allow anyone to query this specific identity resource or allow just 
this WSC to update any identity resource. Therefore, options such as all or just 
one are supported. 
The solution presented in this article does not impose any specific privacy pre-
ference language. However, we have evaluated several different alternatives in 
terms of the following requirements. On one hand, we must allow users to easily 
describe their preferences and on the other hand, we have to translate these prefe-
rences into policies that a Web service provider can enforce. For our prototype we 
have chosen the Extensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) [15] 
since it allows for easy governance of information once the policy has been de-
fined. However, it poses certain usability difficulties in terms of limiting how a 
user can express this information. Previous paragraphs have described the meas-
ures that we have taken to address these problems. 
User-generated privacy preferences (and their expression in the form of privacy 
policies) govern user identity resources. Thus, privacy policies must be associated 
with the identity of a user or, more specifically, with the identity resources that 
they govern. Our solution realizes this association by extending the generic identi-
ty profile as defined by Liberty with a privacy policy description schema. Thus, 
the schema is defined once and can be added to any existing Liberty-based identi-
ty profile. Additionally, this approach allows the PC, using the DST protocol, to 
set (Fig. 6, steps 0 to 3) and query (Fig. 6, steps 4 to 8) the privacy policies asso-
ciated with a given identity resource. 
To set a privacy policy, the PC must play the role of a WSC and include the 
privacy policy as part of the Create or Modify element that is sent to the WSP to 
store the identity resource and its associated privacy policy. This mechanism does 
not require any changes in current DST protocols, as the policy is transmitted in 
the same way as any other information, namely, in the body of the message. On 
arrival, the WSP retrieves the policy and stores it in a policy repository. 
The PC retrieves privacy policies that are associated with an identity resource 
using the DST protocol as well. In this case, however, the PC uses the Query op-
eration. Once the policy has been retrieved, it is translated back into privacy prefe-
rences so that the user can understand it. 
 
 
 
Fig. 6. The Privacy Controller sets and queries privacy policies. 
Finally, privacy policies are enforced whenever a request for an identity re-
source is received by a WSP. To meet this requirement we have introduced three 
functions in the WSP (Fig. 7): Policy Enforcement Point (PEP), Policy Decision 
Point (PDP) and Policy Repository (PR).  
The PEP catches the incoming identity resource request and retrieves informa-
tion about the requesting entity (requestor WSC), the requested identity resource, 
the operation and the user to whom it refers. Then the PEP creates a request for 
the PDP with the information retrieved. When the PDP receives the request it re-
trieves the applicable policies from the PR and compares the request and the poli-
cies before sending a decision back to the PEP. When the PEP receives the deci-
sion it can allow the requested resource retrieval, deny the operation or pause the 
operation until further actions have been completed (e.g., asking the resource 
owner for permission). The last step can be implemented using a Liberty Interac-
tion Service [16].  
 
 
Fig. 7. Sequence diagram for privacy enforcement. 
5   Validation 
To validate our approach we have developed an identity network made up of five 
entities (Fig. 8): 
• A standard IDP/DS that provides the basic infrastructure as defined by the Li-
berty Alliance architecture and protocols. 
• Two modified identity-based WSPs. The first one, namely iProfile, is a per-
sonal profile containing postal address information. The second one, myPay-
mentBroker, is an identity-based payment service that stores credit card num-
bers. These WSPs have been modified to incorporate our contributions. 
• A standard identity-based WSC; an online shop called goShopping. Once a 
user selects a product and decides to buy it goShopping queries myPay-
mentBroker to retrieve the credit card number to charge the user and, if suc-
cessful, then queries iProfile to retrieve the delivery details. 
• A Privacy Controller, which allows users to centrally govern their identity in-
formation in the identity network, to trace the use of the information, and to 
set privacy policies for its future governance. 
Our solution does not introduce any impact on standard-based IDP/DS or 
WSCs implementations. Regarding WSPs, they must enforce privacy policies and 
log transactions related to the release of personal information, which anyway may 
be compulsory according to privacy protection laws in some countries. Addition-
ally, an extension to identity data services is needed, which has been done follow-
ing Liberty recommendations. The extension defines a container for privacy poli-
cies governing the use of the information contained within the profile. This 
extension must be included in any data service supporting privacy policy man-
agement. 
Liberty-based entities were developed using the open source access manage-
ment and federation server platform and libraries Open Web SSO (OpenSSO) [17] 
by Sun Microsystems. With regard to the management and enforcement of privacy 
policies, we have used an open source implementation of XACML [18], also by 
Sun Microsystems. This implementation provides support for creating privacy pol-
icies in the PC and managing and evaluating requests against policies in the 
WSPs. 
The PC and the WSC were deployed on a Tomcat server, while the IDP/DS and 
the WSPs were deployed in a Glassfish Server running the OpenSSO platform. 
 
 
Fig. 8. Demonstration scenario for the prototype validation. 
In our demonstration scenario, a user firstly signs in the PC to obtain a snapshot 
of her information distributed in the identity network (Fig. 3), that is, the personal 
information stored in iProfile and myPaymentBroker. From the PC interface, the 
user can also modify the values stored.  
Additionally, the user can also review the history of use of any piece of this in-
formation. For example, Fig. 4 shows the screenshot that the user sees when she 
chooses to review the history of use of her credit card details stored at myPay-
mentBroker.  
Since goShopping has been denied access to the credit card details, the user is 
not able to buy at this online shop. Thus, using the PC interface, the user modifies 
her privacy preferences. Fig. 5 shows the screenshot that the PC presents to set 
new privacy preferences regarding her credit card details. Once the new prefe-
rences are set, the user is able to go back to goShopping and successfully carry out 
the purchase. 
6   Related work 
The approach to identity management described by Liberty Alliance specifications 
is a solution for the problem of how to manage shared identity resources in a net-
work-centric identity management system. However, this solution does not allow 
for user-centric management of the scattered users' identity resources and privacy 
settings in the identity network. The Liberty approach forces users to know where 
every identity resource is stored and to set privacy preferences for every single 
node of the identity network. Moreover, it cannot possibly provide overall infor-
mation about the flows of identity resources among entities since each entity only 
knows about others to which it has released information or from which it has re-
trieved information. 
Recently, Liberty has announced the release of the Identity Governance 
Framework (IGF) [19], which aims to describe detailed privacy constraints and the 
mechanisms by which entities within an identity network can interact. IGF privacy 
constraints describe fundamental restrictions regarding the propagation, usage, re-
tention, storage and display of identity data for entities involved in consuming and 
providing them. Unfortunately, the IGF is enterprise-oriented and thus does not al-
low for user-centric privacy management. 
A promising initiative for user-centric privacy management is the PRIME Con-
sole [20], which is an interface to the user's identity management system. It allows 
users to create partial identities (pseudonyms) and associate personal data with 
each of these identities, assists the user in understanding privacy policies, makes 
decisions on the basis of the user's preferences and allows users to inspect the 
transaction history for their personal data. However, sometimes identity informa-
tion is not initially disclosed by users. For example, in a network-centric identity 
system some entities can automatically retrieve and offer identity information re-
garding a user, such as geolocation. Therefore, the PRIME Console is not a com-
prehensive solution as it focuses only on user-centric identity systems and fails to 
support network-centric ones. 
The HP Virtual Identity and Profile Broker (VIP Broker) [21] provides a single, 
centralised point of access to distributed identity data, allowing users to monitor 
relevant information flows. With the VIP Broker, users can also configure release 
policies, which will be centrally enforced whenever a request for personal infor-
mation is received. Unlike the VIP Broker, our solution distributes the policies to 
the custodians of the information. Thus, privacy preferences are applied wherever 
the information is stored, avoiding the need for an intermediate broker. This is 
convenient from a business standpoint, since service providers usually want to re-
tain control of the distribution of any information they own. Recently, Google has 
announced the release of the Google Dashboard [22]. The dashboard lists some of 
the information associated with the Google services the user has subscribed and 
provides links to control their personal settings. However, unlike our Privacy Con-
troller, Google Dashboard redirects the user to every service provider in order to 
modify the privacy preferences. Therefore, users are not provided with a compre-
hensive tool from where to centrally define their privacy preferences. In addition, 
users are not able to trace how their information has been used, which is one of the 
contributions of our proposal. 
7   Conclusions 
In this article we have presented a comprehensive solution, the Privacy Controller, 
to help users to actively control the privacy of their personal information while us-
ing services in the digital world. The Privacy Controller leverages various identity 
management technologies (consistent with the Liberty Alliance specifications) to 
help users understand how much personal information about them is being stored, 
who has accessed it and how it will be safeguarded in the future. 
The lack of simple tools and inadequate privacy-awareness among users are 
two major obstacles that prevent the involvement of users in privacy control. 
Therefore, enhanced usability and better default settings play a fundamental role. 
We have described different measures that our Privacy Controller introduces to 
support users in defining their own privacy preferences. Nevertheless, we feel that 
there is room for improvement in this area and thus we are evaluating user model-
ling techniques that allow the automatic generation of user privacy preferences. 
For our solution to be practical, collaboration and coordination with service 
providers is a must: Service providers would have to provide new interfaces and 
capabilities to allow external control of personal data. We envision that in the near 
term governments will force providers to declare the personal information they 
store and to provide standards-based mechanisms to interact with it. As a matter of 
fact, in Europe recent privacy protection initiatives [23] have introduced legisla-
tive principles such as ‘privacy by design’ and ‘accountability’.  
In the future we hope to extend the Privacy Controller to other identity net-
works such as social networks, which are huge and often unregulated sources of 
personal information. We feel that such Web sites urgently need mechanisms to 
provide semantic interoperability between different identity networks. The use of 
ontologies as information mediators might be a promising future direction. 
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